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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article evaluates the ultimate effect of the Supreme Court's recent
attempt to clarify a previously ambiguous area of copyright law. In Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc.,' the Court decided that
copyright law did not protect the white pages listings of a telephone book.
Although the layperson might not care about whether telephone companies
"owned" the phone book, copyright lawyers recognized Feist as the Court's
first attempt to bring order to a very confused and increasingly important area
of copyright law, the application of copyright to factual compilations. 2
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I 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
2 The number of articles which have been written on the subject reflects the confusion
endemic to this area of copyright. See, e.g., Ginsburg, Creation and Cornnercial Value:
Copyright Protection of Works ofInformation, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 1865 (1990); Denicola,
Copyright in Collections of Facts: A 7heory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works,
81 COLUM. L. REV. 516 (1981); Patry, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Reply, 6
CoMM. & THE LAW 11 (1984); Jones, Factual Conpilations and the Second Circuit, 52
BROOKLYN L. REV. 679 (1986); Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and
Representation of Facts, 76 HARv. L. REV. 1569 (1963); Haungs, Copyright of Factual
Conpilations: Public Policy and the First Amendment, 23 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
345 (1990); Note, Copyrighted Compilations of Public Domain Facts in a Directory: The
Criterion of Infringement, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 833 (1977); Note, Copyright and Computer
Databases: Is Traditional Compilation Lav Adequate?, 65 TEX. L. REV. 993 (1987).
The importance of this topic stems from a national economy which depends on the
production and dissemination of information. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN
AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 9-11 (1987). According to one estimate, the
information sector of the economy is now larger than the agricultural and industrial sectors
combined. W. DIZARD, THE COMING INFORMATION AGE: AN OVERVIEW OF
TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 106 (1989). Equally astounding is the recent
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Before Feist, a majority of courts extended protection only to the creative
aspects of factual compilations. 3 Under the "creative selection approach,"
copyright existed only if a given compilation exhibited a minimal amount of
creativity in its selection and arrangement of facts.4 Since some compilations
were no more than the mechanical listing of facts, they received no protection
at all even though the compiler expended a substantial amount of effort to
collect a large number of facts.5 Even if copyright existed, the facts themselves
remained in the public domain and could be copied from the copyrighted work
at will. 6 In short, the creative selection approach guaranteed to future compilers
the ability to base their works on any prior factual compilation so long as they
did not borrow any original selection and arrangement. 7 Consequently,
subsequent producers of competing works enjoyed a competitive advantage
over original producers by reason of not having to discover or otherwise gather
the facts at all.
Other courts, however, took a very different view. Instead of protecting the
creativity found in factual compilations, these courts protected the labor
expended by the compiler in gathering the facts presented. 8 Thus, under the
"sweat theory," they granted full copyright protection as long as the
compilation was the product of meaningful effort.9 This meant that all factual
compilations which contained a significant number of facts received broad
growth of electronic information transfer. In 1986, the entire optical storage market was
estimated at around $200 million. During the 1990s that market will grow between $2.5 to
$4.5 billion. Sehr, High Noon for CD-Rom, DATAMATION, Nov. 1986 at 80. By 1982, the
on line information business had already reached $1.5 billion, and has undoubtedly grown
since then. J. NAlSBrrr, MEGATRENDS 25 (1982). If one proceeds on the assumption that
copyright affects the health of these markets, confusion over copyright in works of
information extracts a heavy price.
3 This approach was taken by the Second, Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuit courts.
Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984); Miller v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981); Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d
569 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 977 (1988); Southwestern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801 (11th Cir. 1985).
4 See Eckes, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984). See also infra notes 16-49 and
accompanying text.
5 See Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 204 (2d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987).
6 See Worth, 827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 977 (1988).
7 See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Sports Eye, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Pa.
1976).
8 Courts taking this approach included the Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Circuits Courts.
See Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 905 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990); Hutchinson Tel.
Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1985); Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 916 F.2d 718 (1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
9 See Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir. 1977) (only
'industrious collection,' not originality, required to sustain copyright in directory of
gardening services).
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copyright protection, no matter how mechanical the selection or presentation.
Courts applying this theory expressly prohibited others from copying even the
facts from copyrighted compilations. Producers of competing works, therefore,
had to proceed as if the original work had never existed. 10 This rule eliminated
the competitive advantage the producers of competing works had under the
creative selection theory.
In Feist, a unanimous Supreme Court" resolved the above described
conflict by using the creative selection approach to deny copyright protection to
the white pages. 12 On its face, this choice clarified the law because it
eliminated the sweat theory as a valid method of applying copyright to factual
compilations. Such doctrinal clarification, however, does not necessarily mean
that copyright's treatment of of factual compilations will become stable or
predictable. This is because courts will probably apply Feist in two different,
and possibly divergent, ways.
In some cases, a straightforward, quasi-esthetic determination about a
compilation's creativity will resolve questions of copyrightability. Courts will
simply decide whether a given compilation exhibits enough creativity to
warrant copyright.
In other cases, copyright policy, and not esthetics, will be the determining
factor. This will occur because decisions about creativity come perilously close
to matters of taste, and not judgment. Each judge knows that his or her
conception of creativity may not be shared by anyone else. Furthermore, even
if his or her notions of creativity are "correct," each judge fears that the
unguided nature of quasi-esthetic determinations risks an incoherent pattern of
decisions. 13 Courts confronted with this dilemma will understandably scrutinize
10 See United Tel. Co. of Missouri v. Johnson Publishing Co., 671 F. Supp. 1514,
1522 (W.D. Mo. 1987), afid, 855 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1988) (second compiler cannot begin
with plaintiffs copyrighted work).
I1 Eight justices joined Justice O'Connor's opinion. Justice Blackmun concurred in the
result, without filing a separate opinion.
12 The reader should be reminded of the distinction between the existence of copyright
protection and copyright infringement. This Article focuses on the issue of whether
copyright protects factual compilations. It does not address related issues of infringement
because the Feist Court based its opinion on a denial of copyright, and not on an
interpretation of infringement. See infra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
13 The Supreme Court has already expressed discomfort with determinations about
creativity in the context of copyright. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. Perhaps
more striking is the Court's struggle to apply the somewhat analogous requirement that
obscene works must, taken as a whole, lack "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). In response to the discomfort caused
by earlier versions of the requirement, Justice Stewart wrote:
It is possible to read the Court's opinion Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California
in a variety of ways. In saying this, I imply no criticism of the Court, which in those
cases was faced with the task of trying to define what may be indefinable. I have
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Feist for values to guide their judgments about creativity.' 4 They will find that
the Court preferred the creative selection approach to the sweat theory because,
according to the Court, the creative selection approach implemented basic
copyright policy-the promotion of "the progress of Science and useful
Arts." 15 In turn, courts interpreting Feist will use this policy as a guide for
reached the conclusion, which I think is confirmed at least by negative implication in the
Court's decisions since Roth and Alberts, that under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments criminal laws in this area are constitutionally limited to hard-core
pornography. I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I
understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never
succeed in intelligbly doing so. But I know it when I see it; and the motion picture
involved in this case is not that.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
14 The use of social policy to guide and justify doctrine has assumed an increasingly
prominent role in modem judicial reasoning. This development has resulted from the
discomfort associated with the modem realization that, contrary to our fervent desires, legal
doctrines frequently offer no solid guidance for deciding cases. Sometimes doctrines
conflict. Perhaps the only existing rule is vague. Even worse, there may be no applicable
doctrine. When this happens, courts must base their decisions on something other than
doctrine. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, Ch. 7 (1961); R. DwoRKIN, TAXING
RIGHTS SERIOUsLY, Ch. 4 (1977); Lyons, Justification and Judicial Responsibility, 72
CALIF. L. REv. 178 (1984). If courts fail to take such actions, their decisions will appear
arbitrary, and critics will attack the court for acting injudiciously. See R. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA 119-20 (1990); Lyons, supra at 185; Sartorius, The Justification of
the Judicial Decision, 78 ETHICs 171 (1968).
15Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1290. The Court characterized the Feist result as "'the essence of
copyright,'" and stated that "the primary objective of copyright is . . . '[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.'" Id. at 1289-90 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, el.
8). This language directly links the Court's decision to a long tradition which holds that
copyright exists solely to provide economic incentives for the production of socially
beneficial works. To put it somewhat differently, copyright should protect a work only if the
work is deemed socially beneficial and its creation would be jeopardized without the
financial incentives provided by copyright. Building on this tradition, copyright should be
shaped to maximize the amount by which the public benefit gained from icreased
production of useful works exceeds the associated costs. See H. Rep. No. 2222, 60th
Cong., 2d Sess.:
Not primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the public,
[copyright] rights are given .... In enacting a copyright law Congress must
consider ... two questions: first, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer
and so benefit the public, and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be
detrimental to the public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under the proper terms
and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the
temporary monopoly.
See also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954), reh'g denied, 347 U.S. 949 (1954):
"The economic philosophy behind the clause emplowering congress to grant patents and
1346 [Vol. 52:1343
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applying the creative selection approach. If the creativity of a given compilation
is unclear, the question will be resolved by asking whether a finding of
creativity (i.e., an extension of copyright protection) would actually advance
"the progress of Science and useful Arts."
Upon first inspection, this simultaneous use of policy and doctrine would
seem to lead copyright towards stability and predictability. Courts should find
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science
and useful Arts.'" See also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,
429 (1984), reh'g denied, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984):
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor
rimarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a
means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special
reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited
period of exclusive control has expired.
For articles taking a similar view, see Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL. STUD. 325 (1989); Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright
Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1045 (1989); Breyer, The Uneasy
Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs,
84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970); Hurt & Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright,
56 AM. ECON. REv. 420 (1966). Finally, a recent treatise by a leading copyright scholar
has taken economics as the primary framework on which to base its analysis. P.
GODLSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW & PRACTICE (1989).
This loud chorus should not, however, be taken as proof of the proposition that
copyright is always best explained or shaped as a matter of economic incentives. Indeed,
many recent articles either express significant dissatisfaction with the overwhelming
emphasis on economics in copyright or explain copyright in noneconomic terms. See Jaszi,
Towards a 7heory of Copyright: 7he Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455;
Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: 7he Challenges of Consistency, Consent
and Encouragenent 7heory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989) (arguing that so-called
"encouragement theory" provides inadequate basis for copyright); Yen, Restoring the
Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990) (pointing
out indeterminacy of economic principles and apparent presence of natural law reasoning in
copyright); Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 997-98 (1990) (criticizing
"unruly brawl" among economists analyzing copyright); Hughes, The Philosophy of
Intellectual Property, 77 GEo. L.J. 287 (1988) (basing explanation on philosophies of
Locke and Hegel); Kauffman, Exposing the Suspicious Foundation of Society's Primacy in
Copyright Law: Five Accidents, 10 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 381 (1986) (contending that
natural rights is the basis for copyright).
The conclusion to be drawn from the noneconomic copyright movement is that a
diverse and sometimes conflicting set of values lies behind the phenomenon of copyright,
and that a broadened perspective on the subject would be beneficial. See Yen, supra, at 559
(advocating use of economics and natural law to study copyright); Brown, Eligibility for
Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV. 579 (1985)
(advocating the combination of economic and authors' rights approaches).
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that policy clarifies and informs doctrinal judgment by giving meaning to
ambiguous concepts like creativity. If courts have a general sense of what they
are trying to accomplish, it may well be easier for them to develop a consistent
method of making decisions. This should result in a reasonably clear and stable
line which separates copyrightable from uncopyrightable compilations.
Further consideration reveals, however, that this felicitous result will occur
only if the suggested policy reasonably describes the effect of extending
copyright to factual compilations on the basis of their creativity. If this is the
case, decisions based on policy and decisions based on doctrine will be
generally consistent, thereby reinforcing one another. By contrast, if extending
copyright to creative compilations has little to do with "the progress of Science
and useful Arts," a different outcome will follow. As an initial matter, courts
would find that the protection of certain creative compilations actually harms
"the progress of Science and useful Arts." Judges would then be forced into
one of two difficult choices. They could follow the creative selection approach
while knowingly disserving adopted policy. Alternatively, they could
implement the desired policy while ignoring the results required by the creative
selection approach. Either action would certainly create ambiguity in the law. If
different courts were to follow each option, the confusion over how copyright
treats factual compilations would become even worse. Irreconcilable conflicts
would certainly ensue.
The foregoing discussion implies that an understanding of Feist's ultimate
effect on copyright begins with an analysis of whether its application of the
creative selection approach to factual compilations reasonably promotes "the
progress of Science and useful Arts." This Article provides such an analysis in
three steps. First the background against which Feist was decided is set by
describing the relevant copyright concepts and their application to factual
compilations. Second, the Feist decision is summarized. Third, economics is
used to describe how copyright promotes "the progress of Science and useful
Arts" and then, the insights developed are used to evaluate the creative
selection approach. This Article shows that copyright makes sense when it is
used to help compilers overcome market conditions which prevent the recovery
of compilers' development costs, and that copyright does not promote its stated
policy when those costs are easily recovered or absorbed by non-profit
organizations or government. The creative selection approach is then
scrutinized to see if it extends copyright in a manner generally consistent with
these observations. The Article shows that the creative selection approach does
not do this, and it concludes with some suggestions for how to interpret Feist in
light of the inconsistency between copyright doctrine and policy.
[Vol. 52:13431348
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II. THE BACKGROUND OF FEJST
A quick look at the copyright code reveals no obvious problems with the
treatment of factual compilations. Section 102(a) extends protection to "original
works of authorship,"' 16 and section 103 specifically mentions compilations as
copyrightable subject matter. 17 The trouble begins when one discovers that
Congress specifically adopted, without change, the definition for copyrightable
subject matter established under the prior copyright statute.' 8 That statute
extended copyright to "all writings of an author." 19 That phrase, in turn,
referred to language in article I of the Constitution which authorizes Congress
to secure to "authors . . .the exclusive rights to their respective writings."
20
Thus, the proper construction of "original works of authorship" depends on
prior judicial interpretation of constitutional language.
Although the constitutional authorization for copyright legislation refers
only to "writings," courts have not limited the scope of copyright to strictly
written matter. This tradition began in the seminal case of Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony.21 In that case, the plaintiff sued the defendant for
reproducing a photograph of Oscar Wilde taken by the plaintiff.22 The
defendant admitted copying, but contended that the plaintiff's photograph was
merely the "reproduction on paper of the exact features of some natural
object... or person .... 23 It was argued that the photograph, therefore,
was not a "writing" and could not be considered copyrightable subject
matter. 24
The Court rejected this argument. Initially, the Court justified the broad
construction of the constitutional term "writings" by noting that the first federal
copyright statute protected maps, charts and books. Since this list included
items which were not literally writings, and since the drafters of the statute
included framers of the Constitution, the Court concluded that the framers
intended a nonliteral interpretation of "writings." 25 The Court stated that
16 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1991).
17 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1991) ("The subject matter of copyright as specified by section
102 includes compilations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing
preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in
which such material has been used unlawfully.").
18 H.R. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 ("The phrase 'original works of authorship,'
which is purposely left undefined, is intended to incorporate without change the standard of
originality established under the present copyright statute.").
19 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1909).
20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
21 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
22 1d. at 53.
23 Id. at 56.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 56-57.
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"authors" were those "to whom anything owed its origin," and that "[b]y
writings in that clause is meant the literary productions of those
authors ".... 26
Having established the broad constitutional scope of copyrightable subject
matter, the Sarony court then considered the defendant's contention that the
plaintiff's photograph was merely a reproduction of pre-existing objects and,
therefore, could not owe its origin to the plaintiff. Although this argument was
plausible for "the ordinary production of a photograph," 27 the Court found that
the plaintiff's photograph was special because it arose
entirely from his own original mental conception, to which he gave visible
form by posing the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and
arranging the costume, draperies, and other various accessories in said
photograph, arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines,
arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the
desired expression, and from such disposition, arrangement, or
representation, made entirely by the plaintiff, he produced the picture in
suit.2
8
Because of this original selection and arrangement, the Court found the
plaintiff's photograph copyrightable.2 9
For purposes of this Article, Sarony carries two important messages. First,
the Court held that copyrightable subject matter had to "owe its origin" to an
identifiable author. 30 By implication, items which already exist at the time of
alleged authorship could never become copyrighted property because a putative
author could not claim credit for their creation. Second, despite this conclusion,
the Court further held that the selection and arrangement of pre-existing items
could constitute copyrightable subject matter if the selection or arrangement
were the "original" product of an individual's mental conception. Thus, the
Sarony plaintiff successfully claimed protection for his selection and
arrangement of the unowned objects portrayed in the photograph. 31
Once the Sarony Court established "originality" as a prerequisite for
copyright protection, lower courts assumed the task of separating original from
unoriginal works. They did this by equating original works with works which
displayed artistic merit. For example, in J.L. Mott Iron Works v. Cow,32 the
plaintiff claimed that the defendant had committed copyright infringement by
26 Id. at 58.
27 Id. at 59.
2 8 1d. at 55.
29 Id. at 60.
3 0 Id. at 58.
31 Id. at59.
32 82 F. 316 (7th Cir. 1897).
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copying designs from the plaintiff's price catalog. 33 In sustaining the lower
court's dismissal of the complaint, the court held that a work could not be
found copyrightable unless it had "some value as a composition, at least to the
extent of serving some purpose other than as a mere advertisement or
designation of the subject to which it is attached." 34 Since the plaintiff's work
was merely a catalog which advertised the plaintiff's wares, it did not satisfy
this requirement.35
Although they might seem strange to our modem sensibilities, decisions
like Mott were perfectly consistent with the Sarony court's language. Among
other things, the Sarony Court noted that the "ordinary production of a
photograph" might not be copyrightable. 36 This statement could easily be seen
as a directive to separate ordinary works from the genuinely creative ones. Of
course, such an approach would leave many works unprotected, perhaps
because a judge or jury would fail to see their artistic merit. Nineteen years
after Sarony, this problem caused the Supreme Court to remove largely, but
not completely, artistic merit as a prerequisite to copyright.
In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,37 the Court considered a
claim brought by a circus owner against a defendant who had copied posters
used to advertise the plaintiff's circus.38 Although such a claim would seem
open and shut under modem copyright law, both the trial court and the court of
appeals had rejected the plaintiff's claim on the ground that advertisements
could not possess the requisite artistic merit to become copyrightable subject
matter.39 In reversing, the Court specifically stated that the copyright act did
not exclude works not associated with "fine art" from protection, and that
"ordinary works" were fully protected. 40 This ruling was necessary because,
according to the Court, judges should rarely, if ever, deny copyright to a work
because of a perceived lack of artistic merit. Instead, the courts should liberally
extend copyright to all works of commercial value or public interest.41
33 Id. at 316.
34 Id. at 318, 321 (quoting Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428, 431 (1891)).
35 Id. at 318-19. See also Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428 (1891); Falk v.
Donaldson, 57 F. 32, 34 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893).
36 Sarony, 111 U.S. at 59.
37 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
38 Id. at 248.
39 Id. at 248. See also Courier Lithographing Co. v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,
104 F. 993 (6th Cir. 1900).
40 188 U.S. at 250.
41 The Court's language is instructive:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest
and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to
miss appreciation .... At the other end, copyright could be denied to pictures which
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Together, Bleistein and Sarony established the law which governs
copyrightable subject matter today. If a work exhibits minimally creative
selection and arrangement, copyright protects it. Denial of copyright has,
therefore, become exceedingly rare. In general, these standards have not been
considered controversial. Few would dispute that the vast majority of
nonfactual written, pictorial and audio works deserve copyright.42 When
applied to factual compilations, however, the standards have spawned
controversy.
Under the principle that no one can claim copyright in items already in
existence at the time of writing, facts themselves cannot be copyrighted. 43
From this it is generally held that the simple listing of a fact cannot support
copyright for two reasons. First, the listing is insufficiently creative to pass
even the low Bleistein standard. Second, extension of copyright would
unnecessarily risk a monopoly over the reported fact.
appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they command the interest of
any public, they have a commercial value-it would be bold to say that they have not an
aesthetic and educational value-and the taste of any public is not to be treated with
contempt. . . . That these pictures had their worth and their success is sufficiently
shown by the desire to reproduce them without regard to the plaintiff's rights.
Id. at 251-52.
42 For an argument that copyright should not exist at all, see Palmer, Intellectual
Property: A Non-Posnerian Law & Econoncs Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 304
(1989) (criticizing patents and copyrights as "unjustifiable interventions into voluntary
market processes").
43 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 111 S.Ct. at 1287; Miller v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Obviously, a fact does
not originate with the author of a book describing the fact. Neither does it originate with the
one who 'discovers' the fact."). This conclusion is reflected in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) which
denies copyright to any discovery, "regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated or embodied in such work." Section 102 reflects congressional
adoption of prior law developed by courts construing the prior copyright statute. H.R. 94-
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 ("Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the scope of
copyright protection under the present law."). See also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) ("No author may copyright his ideas or the
facts he narrates . . . . 'The news element the information respecting current events
contained in the literary production is not the creation of the writer, but is a report of
matters that ordinarily are publicijuris ... .'") (citations omitted).
Acceptance of this result should be tempered, for it rests on what some have called
"the Platonic fact precept." Those skeptical of the result have pointed out that facts do not
exist independently of individual perception. Thus, it is arguably impossible to separate the
fact from a subjective, and therefore original, presentation. See Ginsburg, Sabotaging and
Reconstructing History: A Comment on the Scope of Copyright Protection in Works of
History a/ter Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 29 BULL. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y U.S.A. 647,
658 (1982); Litman, supra note 15, at 996.
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For example, if the dean's office telephone extension is 4340, a directory
listing "Law School Dean-4340" can hardly be considered original. Since the
listing is the mechanical report of a pre-existing fact, writing the words "Law
School Dean-4340" requires so little creativity that it falls outside the
"narrowest and most obvious limits" suggested by Bleistein.44 Moreover, even
if one decided that the listing was sufficiently creative, copyright in the listing
could easily develop into copyright in the underlying fact. This would happen
because there are very few reasonably different ways of conveying the
information contained in the listing. An enterprising individual would simply
obtain copyrights on those few listings and then claim that anyone who
reported the relevant information in the future had violated her copyright. This
would effectively prevent others from borrowing the uncopyrightable
underlying fact and re-reporting it to the public. 45
Of course, if one decides that a report of a single fact is not copyrightable,
then how can a list of numerous facts be copyrightable, as suggested by section
103 of the copyright code? After all, if the mechanical reporting of one fact is
not copyrightable, how does repeating the act many times change the result?46
Courts have responded to this challenge in two separate ways, each of which
has its benefits and drawbacks.
The most common response to this challenge extends the concepts of
Sarony and Bleistein to fit factual compilations. The Sarony Court decided for
the plaintiff because the plaintiff's work included the independent selection and
arrangement of various pre-existing objects. The esthetic nature of the result
convinced the Court that the photograph merited copyright.47 This reasoning
suggests an argument which leads to the copyrightability of factual
44 Denicola, supra note 2, at 525.
45 This reasoning reflects the well established copyright principle that when an idea or
fact can be expressed in only a few ways, copyright will be denied to what would otherwise
be copyrightable expression. See Hedge E. Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 765 F. Supp.
353 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (Correct legal descriptions and other factual information merge with
expressions possible in plaintiffs map. Copyright, therefore, denied.); Cooling Sys. and
Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying merger
doctrine to plaintiff's catalog of replacement radiators); Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword
Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984)
(methods of playing Scrabble capable of so few expressions that paraphrasing of book
excused); Morrisey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967) (contest rules
capable of so few expressions that copyright in rules must be denied); Continental Casualty
Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958)
(particular type of insurance could only be expressed in so few ways that plaintiff had to be
enjoined from claiming infringement of insurance forms); M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER,
NiMMER ON COPYRIGHT, at § 13.03[B][3] (1991).
46 C. Denicola, supra note 2, at 527.
47 Sarony, 111 U.S. at 60 (characterizing plaintiff's photograph as "useful, new,
harmonious, characteristic and graceful").
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compilations. While it is true that the reporting of a single fact does not involve
creativity sufficient to support copyright, the reporting of many facts involves
independent selection and arrangement not unlike that discussed in Sarony. For
example, the photographer's selection of what objects to portray corresponds to
decisions made by the producer of a compilation about which facts to list.
Similarly, the photographer's choice of where to place each object in the frame
may be analogized to decisions the compiler must make to arrange her selected
facts so as to render them accessible to the intended user.
Of course, one might still object on the grounds that the compiler's
selection and arrangement do not lead to the esthetic results which convinced
the Sarony Court to award copyright. Bleistein, however, greatly reduced the
creativity requirement of Sarony. Indeed, according to Bleistein, a work
arguably demonstrates the necessary merit as long as someone wants to copy
it.48 Thus, one can very plausibly maintain that compilations of fact are
copyrightable, as long as they exhibit creativity which passes the minimal
requirement of Bleistein. Under this view, most compilations are
copyrightable.49
If one accepts the foregoing, it might seem that the conflict addressed by
Feist should never have occurred because all questions about the copyright
treatment of factual compilations may be answered by applying Sarony and
Bleistein. A closer look, however, reveals that this approach, which this Article
will refer to as "the creative selection approach," leads to results that many
find counterintuitive.
Consider the logical implications of extending copyright only to the
selection and arrangement of facts in a compilation. If this is the case, then a
second author should be able to borrow information from a compilation
liberally, as long as she rearranges or reselects the facts presented. For
example, in Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co.,5° the plaintiff held copyright in
two books on trivia that he had authored. 51 Each book contained alphabetical
listings of about 6,000 items of trivia.52 The plaintiff accused the defendants,
who had designed the game Trivial Pursuit, of infringing his copyright by
basing the game's questions on his books. 53 Although the defendants admitted
48 See supra note 41.
49 Feis, 111 S. Ct. at 1287 ("[Ciompilations of fact generally are [copyrightable].").
Compare Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984) (listing of baseball
card prices exhibits creativity sufficient to support copyright) with Financial Information,
Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., 80 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 79
(1987) (plaintiffs "daily bond cards" do not exhibit creativity sufficient to support
copyright).
50 827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987).
5 1 Id. at 570.
52 Id.
53 Id.
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consulting the plaintiff's books, the district court granted summary judgment
for the defendants. 54 In affirming, the Ninth Circuit noted that taking facts
from the plaintiff's works was perfectly permissible, and that infringement
could not occur unless the defendants borrowed the plaintiff's selection and
arrangement of the facts. Since the Trivial Pursuit game randomly placed the
borrowed facts on cards, no copying of the plaintiffs alphabetical ordering
occurred. Moreover, since the game contained facts not listed by the plaintiff,
selection had not been taken either. Under the creative selection approach, the
defendants had to prevail. 55
Brief reflection reveals why this result proves troubling to so many.
According to cases like Worth, the creative selection approach allows others to
appropriate, without charge, the information found in any compilation, even if
the borrower immediately puts that information into a competing work. 56 To
the extent that the compiler labored to produce her work, it may not seem fair
to allow others to profit from that labor without paying compensation.
Moreover, the permissive attitude toward borrowing taken by the creative
selection approach would seem to undermine the incentives for creation of
useful works that copyright supposedly provides. If others could appropriate
the fruits of compilers' labor without paying compensation, then no one would
be willing to produce the desired factual compilations, and society's welfare
would suffer.
These arguments carry considerable appeal. It should, therefore, come as
no surprise that many post-Sarony courts managed to reach results contrary to
that suggested by the creative selection approach. In some opinions, courts
54 Id.
55 Id. at 573. See also J.R. O'Dwyer Co., v. Media Mktg. Int'l, Inc., 755 F. Supp.
599 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Black's Guide, Inc. v. Mediamerica, Inc., Copyright L. Dec. (CCH)
26,621 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file, No. 16272); Triangle
Publications, Inc. v. Sports Eye, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Pa. 1976). Cases such as the
foregoing should be distinguished from other cases which extend broad copyright protection
on spurious findings of selection and arrangement. See infra note 57 and accompanying
text.
56 See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Sports Eye, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 682, 685-86(E.D.Pa. 1976):
Plaintiff's real complaint . . . is defendant's use of [the plaintiff's work], without
significant cost, to prepare its own publication a publication which then competes in the
marketplace with plaintiff's paper. But, the answer is... that it is only the method or
form for expressing the data that is copyrightable.
See also Black's Guide, Inc. v. Mediamerica, Inc., Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 26,621
(N.D.Cal. 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file, No. 16272) (court expresses some
regret, but refuses to find infringement even if the defendant had copied information from
the plaintiff's work to produce a competing directory). For a different view, see infra note
69 and accompanying text.
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simply tortured the meaning of "originality" and "creativity" to make dubious
findings about the existence or appropriation of creative selection. 57 In other
cases, courts relied on theories which permitted the direct protection of the
labor invested by a compiler in his work.58
At the outset of this trend, it appears that courts applying this "sweat
theory" did not even see a conflict between their decisions and Sarony and
Bleistein.59 After all, pre-Sarony courts had long protected compilations on the
basis of an author's labor,60 and neither Sarony nor Bleistein explicitly
57 See, e.g., West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987) (finding creative selection in West's ordering of
cases and pagination in case reporters); Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770
F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding creative selection in listing and alphabetical ordering of
white pages); Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co., 768 F.2d 145 (7th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986) (defendant infringed plaintiff's map despite
different presentation of data). See also Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 1894 ("[M]any courts
will strain to find (or will simply declare the existence of) 'selection and arrangement' in
such patently nonselective and un-'arranged' compilations as, for example, geographically
determined alphabetical address directories.").
58 Perhaps the most widely quoted statement in support of protecting compilers' labor
comes from Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83 (2d
Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922). In Jeiveler's Orcular, the Second Circuit
found a directory of trade symbols copyrightable. In so holding, the court wrote:
The right to copyright a book upon which one has expended labor in its preparation
does not depend upon whether the materials which he has collected consist or not of
matters which are publici juris, or whether such materials show literary skill or
originality, either in thought or in language, or anything more than industrious
collection. The man who goes through the streets of a town and puts down the names of
each of the inhabitants, with their occupations and their street number, acquires material
of which he is the author. He produces by his labor a meritorious composition, in which
he may obtain a copyright, and thus obtain the exclusive right of multiplying copies of
his work.
Id. at 86. This statement was explicitly criticized by the Feist Court as an illegitimate
statement of the sweat theory. 111 S. Ct. at 1295.
59 For example, in Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 91 F. 484 (9th Cir. 1937), the Ninth
Circuit simultaneously cited Bleistein and Jeweler's Orcular. In Leon, the defendant
borrowed the information in the plaintiffs telephone directory. However, instead of
reproducing the plaintiff's alphabetical ordering of names with telephone numbers, the
defendant classified its listings by ascending telephone number with accompanying names.
Leon, 91 F. at 485. Leon is clearly a sweat theory case because it found infringement even
though the defendant used its own selection and arrangement of data.
60 For a pre-Sarony statement about copyright's protection of labor, see E. DRONE, A
TREATISE ON THE LAw OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT
BRTAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 386 (1879): "[It is] a fundamental principle of the law
of copyright... that a work, to be free from piracy, must be the result of the author's 'own
labor, skill, and use of common materials and common sources of knowledge open to all
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terminated that practice. 61 Later on, however, when the implications of the
creative selection approach became clear, these courts articulated their
dissatisfaction with creative selection results and stated a preference for the
sweat theory.
Perhaps the most articulate example of this position is National Business
Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.62 In that case, the plaintiff, National
Business Lists, sued Dun & Bradstreet for attempts to monopolize the market
for mailing lists. Dun & Bradstreet counterclaimed, alleging among other
things that mailing lists sold by National Business Lists infringed copyrights in
numerous credit reference books published by Dun & Bradstreet. 63 In an
opinion which considered only the intellectual property claim, the court noted
that Dun & Bradstreet had published its works for many years. They contained
large amounts of information about various businesses, including their names
and addresses. 64 Dun & Bradstreet claimed that National Business Lists
committed copyright infringement when it based its mailing lists on the Dun &
Bradstreet works. 65
For purposes of this Article, the interesting point about National Business
Lists is that the counterdefendant did not copy Dun & Bradstreet's works
wholesale. Instead, National Business Lists merely extracted the names and
addresses found in Dun & Bradstreet's work and formed mailing lists with that
information. These lists were then checked against telephone directories and
augmented with names and addresses not found in Dun & Bradstreet's works. 66
Under the creative selection approach, Dun & Bradstreet had a poor
copyright claim. Since National Business Lists augmented and changed the
information presented, neither its selection nor arrangement could be
considered borrowed from Dun & Bradstreet.67 Nevertheless, the court found
in favor of Dun & Bradstreet. In a laudably candid opinion, the court expressed
dissatisfaction with results reached under the creative selection approach. The
court then followed the line of cases which extended protection not to the
men.'" (quoting Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 624 C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436)
(Story, J.). The long existence of this view is discussed at length in Ginsburg, supra note 2,
at 1875-81.
61 As the reader will recall, Sarony upheld a plaintiff's attempt to expand the scope of
copyrightable subject matter. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text. Moreover,
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903), explicitly mentioned the
copyrightability of directories. Id. at 250 ("The least pretentious picture has more originality
in it than directories and the like, which may be copyrighted.").
62 552 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
63 Id. at 90.
64 Id.
65 Id.
6 6 Id. at91.
67 See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
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creative aspects of Dun & Bradstreet's compilation, but to the very labor of
collection. The court wrote:
Compilations such as D&B's have value because the compiler has collected
data which otherwise would not be available. The compiler's contribution to
knowledge normally is the collection of the information, not its arrangement.
If his protection is limited solely to the form of expression, the economic
incentives underlying the copyright laws are largely swept away.
Recognizing this, the courts have long afforded protection under the
copyright law against appropriation of the fruits of the compiler's industry.
That protection does not fit nicely into the conceptual framework of
copyright law and for that reason has been criticized . . . The courts have
generally rested, however, not on an analysis of copyright concepts but on the
economic incentives premise of the copyright law and the injustice of
permitting one to appropriate the fruit of another's labor.68
The coexistence of cases like Worth and National Business Lists created a
sharp conflict among the circuits. Under the creative selection approach, a
second compiler was clearly allowed to take advantage of at least some of the
first compiler's research. By contrast, the principle of protecting the first
compiler's labor destroyed the second compiler's ability to build on the first
compiler's work. Instead, courts following this so-called "sweat theory"
consistently held that the second compiler had to proceed as if the first
compiler's work had never existed. In other words, the second compiler had to
gather all of her information from sources other than the first compiler's work.
The only permissible use of the first compiler's work was as a device for
checking back for errors. 69 These drastically different results set the stage for
Feist.
68 National Business Lists, 552 F. Supp. at 92.
69 The clearest recent statement of this position is Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v.
Directory Serv. Co., 768 F.2d 145, 149 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061
(1986):
The right to "check back" does not imply a right to start with the copyrighted work.
Everyone must do the same basic work, the same "industrious collection" . ... The
second compiler must assemble the material as if there had never been a first
compilation; only then may the second compiler use the first as a check on error.
See also Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 5-6 (7th Cir. 1977) ("Another
is entitled to make his own compilation ... using information in the public domain, but he
is not entitled merely to copy the copyrighted list.").
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II. THE FEIST DECISION
As mentioned previously, Feist involved the copyrightability of telephone
directory white pages. The plaintiff and respondent, Rural Telephone Service
Company, held a monopoly franchise which permitted it to provide telephone
service to a number of communities in northwest Kansas. Pursuant to state law,
Rural Telephone produced an annually updated telephone directory which
contained a typical white pages section. 70
The defendant and petitioner, Feist Publications, Inc., was a publishing
company that produced area-wide telephone books. The directory at stake in
the litigation covered eleven different service areas and contained over 46,000
telephone listings. The area covered by the Feist directory overlapped a portion
of the area serviced by Rural Telephone. 71
In preparing its directory, Feist successfully bought permission to use the
white pages from ten of the eleven telephone companies whose listings would
be duplicated. Only Rural Telephone refused. Undeterred by this refusal, Feist
based part of its directory on Rural Telephone's white pages anyway. Feist
simply took the desired portion of Rural Telephone's listings and incorporated
the information into the Feist directory. 72 When Rural Telephone discovered
the copying, it sued Feist for copyright infringement. 73
Feist squarely presented the Court with the very conflict which troubled the
circuit courts. If it applied the creative selection principles derived from Sarony
and Bleistein, Rural Telephone would have no effective protection against
competitors like Feist who appropriated valuable information. This might well
seem damaging to public policy and unfair. 74 Conversely, if the Court used the
70 111 s. Ct. at 1286.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1286-87. According to the Court's opinion, Feist's employees conducted
additional research to verify and augment Rural Telephone's listings. Despite this, four
entirely fictitious listings created by Rural Telephone were reproduced in the Feist
directory. Id. at 1287. This certainly suggests shoddy verification by Feist, and raises the
possibility that verification was attempted only to put a good face on Feist's wholesale
appropriation of information from Rural Telephone's directory.
73 Id. at 1287.
74 Under the creative selection approach, Rural Telephone's copyright (if it existed at
all) would cover only the selection and arrangement of its white pages directory. Rural
Telephone's claim would thus rest on two related propositions. First, Rural Telephone
selected which customers to portray in its white pages directory. Second, it arranged the
customers in alphabetical order.
These propositions, however, lend little support to Rural Telephone's case against
Feist. At the outset, Feist could claim that Rural Telephone's listings were not sufficiently
creative to warrant copyright protection. After all, the decision to list one's customers is
hardly creative. Similarly, the use of alphabetical ordering is so trite that calling it creative
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sweat theory, it could extend meaningful protection to Rural Telephone.75 Such
action would, however, damage the well-established proposition that originality
is a prerequisite for copyright protection. 76
The foregoing suggests the justifications the Court would have to construct
for the two general directions in which it could proceed. If the Court decided
for the defendant, it would have to square its doctrinal choice with public
policy and notions of fairness. If the Court decided for the plaintiff, it would
have to explain why it chose to ignore the guidance of its own well-established
doctrine. Although opinions could have been written to support either
possibility, the Court chose to follow the creative selection approach.
Not surprisingly, the Court began by restating basic doctrines and results.
After summarizing facts, the Court set forth the originality requirement. 77 The
Court then applied the originality requirement to statements of fact and
concluded that the facts themselves cannot be copyrighted. 78 Next, the Court
used the standard creative selection explanation to conclude that factual
would render the originality standard a nullity. See supra note 57 and accompanying text;
Ginsburg, supra note 2 at 1894 (criticizing decisions which found white pages copyrightable
under creative selection approach). Even if these claims were rejected, Feist could still
argue that neither its selection of listings nor their arrangement were borrowed from Rural
Telephone. Feist would note that it did not reproduce all of Rural Telephone's listings and
in fact added additional ones from elsewhere. Moreover, Feist could quite plausibly contend
that it borrowed the alphabetical arrangement of its listings from other, public domain
directories.
75 One might argue that the sweat theory does not extend protection to Rural
Telephone because Rural Telephone expended no meaningful effort in assigning and
printing the telephone numbers of its customers. Since state law required Rural Telephone
to publish its directory, the cost of doing so was presumably built in to the rates Rural
Telephone charged its customers. Thus, denying copyright in this case would neither
damage the incentives for producing telephone white pages nor deprive Rural Telephone of
a fair economic return. This argument, however, had been expressly rejected by the Eighth
Circuit. Its application in Feist might, therefore, have been problematic. See Hutchinson
Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1985).
76 In this case, application of the sweat theory would prohibit Feist from basing its
directory on Rural Telephone's listings. See supra notes 58-69 and accompanying text. This
would damage the originality requirement because Feist borrowed little which is clearly
original.
77 111 S. Ct. at 1287 ("The sine qua non of copyright is originality .... Original, as
the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the
author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal
degree of creativity.") Id.
78 Id. at 1288 ("'No one may claim originality as to facts.' . . . This is because facts do
not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is one between creation and
discovery: the first person to find and report a particular fact has not created the fact; he or
she has merely discovered its existence.") (citations omitted).
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compilations may be copyrighted if they are sufficiently original. 79 The Court
finished its exposition of basics by explaining the consequences of applying the
creative selection approach to factual compilations:
This inevitably means that copyright in a factual compilation is thin.
Notwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler remains free to use
the facts contained in another's publication to aid in preparing a competing
work, so long as the competing work does not feature the same selection and
arrangement. 80
At this point, the Court had done no more than state well-known doctrines
and conclusions consistent with the view taken by a majority of circuit courts.
If it had so desired, the Court could have simply gone on to apply the creative
selection approach to the case at hand. Simple doctrinal adherence to the
requirement of originality could have supported the defendant's victory.
However, the Court did not do this. Apparently, it felt that doctrine alone
provided insufficient support to its preference for the creative selection
approach. In particular, the Court seemed to find the concerns of sweat theory
proponents sufficiently troubling to require rebuttal. The Court, therefore, used
the paragraphs which immediately followed its exposition of basic results to
explain why the concerns raised by sweat theorists could be ignored. 8'
The Court began by recognizing the possible unfairness of failure to
protect a compiler's labor. This possibility, however, could be overlooked, for
the failure to protect a compiler's labor is "the essence of copyright."82 The
Court stated that the policy behind copyright was to promote "the Progress of
Science and useful Arts." 83 By making this assertion, the Court adopted a long
tradition which states that copyright is not meant to secure the rights of
authors, but only to advance the public welfare. Thus, fairness to compilers
was simply not an issue.84 As to the possibility that protecting a compiler's
labor might be necessary to encourage the desired production of factual
compilations, the Court stated that the creative selection approach correctly
implemented copyright's policy of encouragement. The Court used this
79 Id. at 1289 ("Thus, even a directory that contains absolutely no protectible written
expression, only facts, meets the constitutional minimum for copyright protection if it
features an original selection or arrangement.").
80 Id.
81 Id. 1289-90.
82 Id. at 1289-90. ("It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler's labor
may be used by others without compensation. As Justice Brennan has correctly observed,
however, this is not 'some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme.' It is, rather, 'the
essence of copyright.") (citations omitted).
83 Id. at 1290.
84 See supra note 15.
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reasoning to extend copyright protection only to the creative aspects of factual
compilations, and not to the compiler's labor itself.85
Having now ostensibly demonstrated the irrelevance of sweat theorists'
concerns, the Court proceeded to explain how the sweat theory could not
coexist with the superior creative selection approach.8 6 This inconsistency
meant that courts which had adopted the sweat theory had simply
misunderstood the copyright statute.87 The Court underscored this point by
recapping the copyright statute's legislative history, which defined the phrase
"original works of authorship" by referring to the originality standard.88
Having completed its attack on the sweat theory, the Court concluded its
opinion by applying the creative selection approach to the case at hand.
According to the Court, Rural Telephone's case hinged on whether Feist had
copied anything "original" to Rural Telephone.8 9 The Court concluded that
Feist had not copied any original material, but it reached that conclusion in an
interesting way.
Ordinarily, one would assume that the answer to whether Feist had copied
any original material would start with an identification of what Feist had
copied. The Court stated that Feist had taken "1,309 names, towns, and
telephone numbers" from Rural Telephone's white pages. 90 Since copyright
could extend only to the selection and arrangement of this information, one
would expect the Court to proceed by analyzing whether any selection or
85 Id.:
To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but
encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a
work .... This principle, known as the idea/expression or fact/expression dichotomy,
applies to all works of authorship. As applied to a factual compilation, assuming the
absence of original written expression, only the compiler's selection and arrangement
may be protected; the raw facts may be copied at will. This result is neither unfair nor
unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright advances the progress of science and
art.
86 Id. at 1291-92.
87 Id. at 1291. The Court stated "But some courts misunderstood the statute," and then
cited Leon and Jeweler's Circular, two cases which supported the sweat theory. The Court
later wrote, "Making matters worse, these courts developed a new theory to justify the
protection of factual compilations. Known alternatively as 'sweat of the brow' or
'industrious collection,' the underlying notion was that copyright was a reward for the hard
work that went into compiling facts." Id. In point of fact, the criticism of these cases was
not entirely correct, given the then well-established practice of protecting the labor invested
in compilation. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
88 Id. at 1292-95.
89 Id. at 1296.
90 Id.
1362 [Vol. 52:1343
COPYRIGHT & ECONOMICS
arrangement was borrowed at all.91 Since, as noted earlier, it seems that Feist
had not borrowed Rural Telephone's selection or arrangement, 92 the Court
could then have decided for Feist by finding that no infringement had occurred.
This would have been entirely consistent with the Court's earlier statement that
"copyright in a factual compilation is thin." 93
Surprisingly, the Court did not do this. Instead, the Court apparently
assumed that Feist did take Rural Telephone's selection and arrangement, 94 and
reached for the question of whether Rural Telephone's white pages were
copyrightable. The Court concluded that they were not.95
As to the selection of listings, the Court made two observations. First, the
selection was too basic to satisfy the creativity requirement. Although Rural
Telephone's decision to list its customers was conceivably a "selection," the
selection was so "obvious" that it could hardly be considered creative.
96
Second, the Court noted that Kansas law required Rural Telephone to publish a
directory of its customers. This too made Rural Telephone's selection
insufficiently creative.97
The Court made similar observations about Rural Telephone's alphabetical
arrangement of listings. The Court did recognize that Rural Telephone arguably
chose this ordering over other possibilities. Nevertheless, the alphabetical
91 Feist admitted that the directory as a whole was copyrightable. Id. at 1296.
92 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
93 111 S. Ct. at 1289.
94 One could plausibly conclude that such an assumption was incorrect. See supra note
74 and accompanying text.
95 Id. at 1296.
96 Id. The Court's use of the term "obvious" is puzzling. As noted previously,
copyright doctrine clearly protects "ordinary works." See supra notes 37-42 and
accompanying text. By contrast, the term "obvious" brings to mind section 103 of the
Patent Code, which states that a patent cannot be obtained
if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1991) (emphasis added). The patent code's apparent denial of protection
to ordinary advances raises the possibility that Feist changed dramatically the scope of
copyrightable subject matter. This possibility should, however, be discounted in light of the
Feist Court's other statements about copyright's low standard of originality. See 111 S. Ct.
1296 ("The standard of originality is low."). For this reason, it is important for analysts to
consciously avoid the conceptual baggage associated with the patent term "obvious" when
construing Feist. This could perhaps best be done by eschewing the word "obvious" in
copyright. Instead, Rural Telephone's selection of listings should be labelled so mechanical
that it cannot exhibit the creativity needed to support copyright.
97 Id. at 1296-97.
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ordering of names in white pages was so common that "it is practically
inevitable." 98 Rural Telephone's alphabetical ordering, therefore, displayed too
little creativity to support copyright. 99
IV. COPYRIGHT AND THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC GOODS
This Article's analysis of the creative selection approach begins by
articulating how copyright promotes "the progress of Science and useful Arts."
If copyright did not exist, the production of socially beneficial works might be
unprofitable. Individuals who write might find their works copied by others,
and perhaps resold at a price cheaper than the author could match. If this
occurs, potential authors would find it unprofitable to write, and society would
suffer. Copyright prevents others from copying authors' works without
permission. Thus, by eliminating authors' competition, copyright makes the
production of works profitable. The increased production of works then
advances the progress of science and art.
Of course, it must also be recognized that the above described promotion
comes at a price. All authors borrow from other works. 1°° By prohibiting
98 Id. at 1297.
99 Id. An interesting issue worth mentioning is the question of whether producers of
unoriginal compilations can find protection outside copyright law. In 1918, the Supreme
Court held that state law could prohibit the borrowing of information from uncopyrighted
news reports. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). This
result suggests that state law could augment the protection available under federal copyright
law. Later developments have, however, cast considerable doubt on this possibility.
In particular, the 1976 revision of the copyright statute contained a provision which
expressly pre-empted "all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright. .. ." 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1988). Thus, the
availability of state law to compilers seeking additional protection now depends on whether
courts find such protection "equivalent" to copyright. Not surprisingly, courts and
commentators have approached this problem in ways which lead to different results. An
analysis of the possibilities is beyond the scope of this Article. This Article, however, will
proceed on the assumption that state law cannot substantially increase the protection
available to compilers. For analysis of the pre-emption problem, see Brown, Unification: A
Cheerfid Requiem for Common Law Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1070 (1977); Goldstein,
Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory Licenses: Testng the
Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REv. 1107 (1977); Abrams, Copyright,
Misappropriation, and Preemption: Constitutional and Statutory Limits of State Protection,
1983 Sup. Cr. REv. 509; McNamara, Copyright Protection, Effecting the Analysis
Prescribed by Section 301, 24 B.C.L. REV. 963 (1983).
100 See Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436):
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be few, if any, things,
which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Everybook in
literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which
was well known and used before.
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borrowing from copyrighted works, copyright makes it harder for authors to
produce new works. Those authors must pay to borrow, or they must start
from scratch. These obstacles hinder the production of beneficial works,
thereby retarding "the progress of Science and useful Arts."
These conflicting results suggest that copyright must strike a balance
between giving authors adequate incentives to produce and making available
ample material from which future works can be produced. As applied to factual
compilations, the creative selection approach arguably does this by extending
protection only to creatively arranged compilations while leaving facts in the
public domain. Close scrutiny, however, reveals that this balance is not
necessarily ideal.
If copyright operates by exchanging incentives to production for
impediments to creation, it follows that copyright should maximize the benefits
of increased production over the costs of copyright. When this insight is
applied to the creative selection approach, the methodology for this section
becomes clear. If the creative selection approach is designed to increase
benefits gained from factual compilations, then it would seem that the creative
selection approach is consistent with promoting "the progress of Science and
useful Arts." If the converse is true, however, it would appear that the creative
selection approach does little to advance copyright policy, at least in the context
of factual compilations. Determining which of these possibilities is true
requires a look at the economic principles which describe how copyright
works.
A. The Economics of Public Goods
Economists generally explain copyright as law which makes possible the
private production of public goods. 101 This description results from differences
in the economic properties of public goods and private goods. Private goods,
which make up the bulk of goods studied by economists, have two qualities
which are important for the purposes of this discussion. First, private goods
exhibit rivalrous consumption. This means that only one person may consume a
given unit of a private good. If someone eats an apple, no one else may do so.
Second, private goods exhibit excludability. This means that sellers of private
goods have the ability to prevent those who do not pay for the good from
consuming the good. One generally does not obtain an apple to eat unless one
purchases it from a willing seller. 102
101 See Landes & Posner, supra note 15; Breyer, supra note 15; Hurt & Schuchman,
supra note 15; R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 112-16, 139-44 (1988).
102 S. CALL & W. HOLOHAN, MICROECONOMICs 455-56 (1983); R. COOTER & T.
ULEN, supra note 101, at 108-09.
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By contrast, public goods exhibit nonrivalrous consumption and
nonexcludability. To take a common example of a public good, consider a
lighthouse. 10 3 While only one person may consume an apple, any number of
sailors can use a lighthouse to be warned of imminent danger. While the seller
of an apple can prevent nonpurchasers from enjoying it, the lighthouse owner
has no method of extracting payment from all who benefit from the beacon. 104
Nonrivalrous consumption and nonexcludability have severe consequences for
the private supply of public goods.
As the reader is probably aware, a fundamental insight of modem
economics is that under perfect conditions, the unrestricted market will induce
the optimal production of private goods. Since rational individuals are assumed
to behave in a self-interested fashion, 10 5 they will naturally engage in mutually
beneficial transactions until no such transactions remain. Thus, producers will
continue to make and sell private goods as long as consumers remain willing to
pay an amount greater than the marginal cost of production. As the supply of
goods increases, the price will eventually fall to the point at which it equals the
marginal cost of production. At this point, producers no longer profit from
selling the private good, and they cease additional production. The market has
reached an equilibrium of supply and demand for which the marginal cost of
production, marginal benefit of consumption, and price are equal.'16 According
to economists, this equilibrium represents an efficient, or optimal, allocation of
society's resources. 107 Moreover, the tendency of unencumbered markets to
produce this equilibrium suggests that the law needs to do relatively little to
advance the optimal allocation of society's resources.108
The market for public goods, however, carries no such presumption of
optimality. The problem begins with nonrivalrous consumption. When a
consumer buys a private good, her payment finances one unit of production
103 See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 45, 159 (6th
ed. 1964); R. Cooter & T. Ulen, supra note 101, at 46.
104 See A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCnON 251-52 (1969).
105 For economic definitions of and discussion about rational individuals, see H.
VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 80-84 (1978); Georgescu-Roegen, Choice,
Expectations, and Measurability, 69 Q.J. ECON. 503 (1954); Harrison, Egoism, Altruism,
and Market Illusions: 77te Limits of Laiv and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309 (1986).
106 R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 101, at 36.
10 7 Id. at 44-45, 49.
108 This suggestion is the result of the Coase theorem, which states that in the absence
of transaction costs, the assignment of a legal right will not effect the efficient allocation of
social resources. As long as transaction costs remain low, the Coase theorem remains
relatively unaffected. If transaction costs become high, then governmental action may be
necessary to attain an efficient allocation of resources. See Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (setting forth the so-called "Coase theorem"); A.M.
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 11-14 (1989).
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which she alone consumes. 10 9 Payment for a public good, however, finances
one unit of production which any number of people can consume. 110 This
creates an interesting problem, for the possibility of enjoying a public good
paid for by others 1' gives individuals the incentive to avoid purchasing a
public good. If a sufficient number of people follow this incentive, 112 the
public good will never be provided. 113 This so-called "free rider" problem
leads to the general statement that markets ordinarily provide a less than
optimal supply of public goods. 14
The foregoing analysis suggests that government can overcome the
problems associated with public goods by subsidizing their production. In some
cases, government may finance production from tax revenues. In other cases,
government may enact laws which eliminate the benefits of free riding. 115
These techniques, however, are not a panacea to the public goods problem.
If government decides to finance production from tax receipts, it
encounters the problem of identifying the individuals who should be taxed and
the amounts they should pay. Although economic theory suggests that each
person should pay a tax equal to the amount she is willing to pay for access to
the public good, 16 measuring that amount is extremely difficult. Thus,
although government will undoubtedly provide some amount of the desired
public good, it will probably over or undersupply it.
109 See supra note 101-02 and accompanying text.
110 This is the direct consequence of nonrivalrous consumption. Once a lighthouse has
been paid for, an infinite number can "consume" it. See A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, supra
note 104, at 251-52.
111 This is the direct consequence of nonexclusion, for those who paid for the public
good will not be able to prevent others from enjoying it. See A. ALcHIAN & W. ALLEN,
supra note 104, at 251-52.
112 People who follow such an incentive are dubbed "free riders." R. COOTER & T.
ULEN, supra note 101, at 109.
113 Suppose that ten boats use a harbor which needs a lighthouse to mark its entrance.
Suppose further that a lighthouse could be built for $10,000, and that each boat owner
would reap a total benefit of $4,000 from the lighthouse's existence. A social cost-benefit
analysis clearly dictates that construction should proceed. (Total benefit of $40,000 (ten
boats with benefits of $4,000 each) less construction costs of $10,000 = Net benefit of
$30,000). Indeed, it would be rational for any three boat owners to jointly finance
construction, for they would each reap benefits of $667. However, if a given boat owner
can avoid paying for the lighthouse, she will enjoy the full benefit of the lighthouse ($4,000)
while paying for none of the cost. By contrast, those who pay for the lighthouse will benefit
less, for they must bear their share of construction costs. This dynamic suggests that many
boat owners will wait for construction of the lighthouse in hopes that their colleagues will
pay for it first. Of course, if no one acts, the lighthouse will never be built, and all will
suffer.
114 R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 101, at 109.
115 Id., at 46-48.
116 H. VARLAN, supra note 105, at 199-200.
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An equally difficult problem occurs if government tries to encourage the
private production of public goods by eliminating the benefits of free riding,
for allowing the producer of public goods to charge everyone who consumes
the good is presumptively wasteful. Once production of a public good has been
paid for, an infinite number of people can share consumption of the good
without harming either the producer or those who financed production. After
all, the producer has gained a profit from the first purchasers, who in turn have
acquired something of greater value than the amount paid. Since one person's
consumption of a public good does not affect consumption by others, expenses
(besides distribution costs) incurred by those other than the initial purchasers
are unnecessary. It therefore follows that a producer of public goods should
ideally be allowed to charge consumers only until costs of production have
been met. 117 Such government control of sales and prices is, however,
generally foreign to our system of private production and sale of goods.
Government policy makers who want to encourage private production of public
goods are, therefore, likely to find that all of their options are less than
perfect.118
The economics of public goods is directly applicable to the production of
all intellectual property. In particular, factual compilations often share the
characteristics of public goods. First, any number of people can read or
otherwise use facts without impairing their use by others. Thus, compilations
exhibit nonrivalrous consumption. Second, it is often difficult to prevent those
who do not pay compilers from using factual compilations. Easy access to
photocopying machines and computer equipment generally allows free riders to
inexpensively copy or otherwise reproduce the compilation. Compilations,
therefore, show some nonexcludability."l 9
The public goods nature of factual compilations suggests that their free
market supply will often fall short of the ideal. Copyright is clearly one of the
tools which could be used to combat this problem by eliminating the benefits of
free riding. Indeed, a perfect copyright balance could be struck by allowing
producers of compilations to recover their development costs, but no more.
Such precision, however, might be unrealistic, so this Article proceeds on the
117 See A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, supra note 104, at 251-52; Besen, New
Technologies and Intellectual Property: An Economic Analysis, The RAND Corp., IST-
8415297-NSF at 4 (1987).
118 For additional readings on the private production of public goods, see Demsetz,
The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J. L. & ECON. 293 (1970); Hirshleifer, The
Private and Social Value of Infornntion and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM.
ECON. REv. 561 (1971); Oakland, Public Goods, Perfect Competition, and
Underproduction, 82 J. POL. ECON. 927 (1974); Novos & Waldman, The Effects of
Increased Copyright Protection, An Analytic Approach, 92 J. POL. ECON. 236 (1984);
Besen & Kirby, Private Copying, Appropriability, and Optimal Copying Royalties, The
RAND Corp., R-3546-NSF (1987).
119 But see infra note 130 and accompanying text.
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somewhat relaxed view that copyright works best by protecting only those
compilations whose development costs cannot otherwise be recouped.
B. Recouping the Development Costs for Production of Factual
Compilations
Conclusions about compilers' ability to recoup development costs start with
a consideration of how factual compilations are marketed and distributed. In the
basic transaction, the compiler sets a single price and sells copies of the
compilation to all willing to pay the price. A cursory look at this situation
suggests that the compiler is unlikely to recoup development costs because any
purchaser can quickly undercut her in the market. After all, a compiler must
price copies high enough to recover development costs plus the costs of
producing and distributing the copies. 120 By contrast, anyone who wants to
undercut a compiler need only incur the cost of buying one copy of the work
plus the costs of producing and distributing copies. This competitive advantage
presumably allows a competitor to price his copies lower than the original
compiler, with the result that the original compiler never sells enough copies to
recoup her costs. This scenario represents a classic free rider problem which
must be remedied if any compilations are to be produced at all. A closer look,
however, reveals that things are not as grim as they first seem.
At the outset, it must be mentioned that the sale of information is not the
only method by which a compiler recoups development costs. Sometimes
compilers release information to spur sales of other goods and services. 121 In
other cases, development costs are paid for by nonprofit organizations or
government.' 22 For these compilations, the free rider problem is either
120 Besen, supra note 117, at 11.
121 Concert halls distribute fists of programs, dates, prices and performers without
charge. Similarly, most stores compile and distribute catalogs and distribute them free to
potential customers.
122 To take a simple example, libraries catalog their collections, and generally provide
the public with free access to the resulting compilations. In many cases, libraries cooperate
with one another to produce computerized data bases covering the collections of all member
libraries. Libraries who join these cooperative, nonprofit networks garner substantial cost
savings in developing their own catalogs. Interestingly, these networks are now seeking
copyright protection for their compilations. See Brown, Copyright and Computer
Databases: 7he Case of the Bibliographic Utility, 11 RUrGERS COMP. & TECH. L.J 17,
18-19 (1985); Moore, Ownership of Access Information: Exploring the Application of
Copyright Law to Library Catalog Records, 4 CoMP. L.J. 305, 321-29 (1983).
An equally interesting development is emerging in the area of mapmaking. Recently,
the United States Government has made available the so-called "TIGER" (Topologically
Integrated Geographical Encoding and Referencing System) files. These files represent a
digitized street map for the United States. Under law, these files are gratuitously distributed
on CD-ROM or magnetic tapes to educational institutions and libraries designated as
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eliminated or of diminished importance. Furthermore, even if recoupment
depends on the actual sale of information, it does not inevitably follow that
copyright is necessary.
If the ratio of sales to development costs is high enough, free rider
incentives are effectively eliminated .23 Suppose that a compiler incurs 1,000
dollars in development costs, and that she expects to sell 1,000 copies of the
work at a production and distribution cost of one dollar per copy. If our
compiler is to recoup her development costs, she must price each copy no
lower than two dollars. 124 If the free rider incurred the same production and
distribution costs as the compiler, he could offer the same work for as little as
one dollar and one cent per copy.125 Thus, a free rider could successfully
undercut the compiler's price and appropriate the expected sales. By contrast,
consider what would happen if the expected sales for our compiler were
100,000 copies. Now she can spread recoupment of her development costs over
an additional 99,000 works. Consequently, she can offer a price as low as one
dollar and one cent. 126 This spreading of recoupment costs makes it impossible
for a free rider to appropriate the entire market by greatly diminishing any
available cost advantage. Indeed, under these facts a free rider would be forced
to offer his competing work at the same price of one dollar and one cent. 127
Even when free rider incentives remain intact, resourceful compilers may
still be able to recoup their development costs. Many of these opportunities
involve the exploitation of the natural monopoly which follows first
publication. After all, any free riding competitor must purchase an original, set
government depositories. Businesses may purchase them at cost: $10,000 for CD-ROM and
$87,000 for magnetic tapes. When combined with the appropriate software, the TIGER files
greatly speed certain types of mapmaking. Such massive subsidy would obviously decrease
the size of development costs. See Larson, TIGER Opens New Mapping Vistas for
Businesses, AMERICAN DEMOGRAPHICS 16 (June 1990); Fost, 77 Next Generation of
Computer Mapping, AMERICAN DEMOGRAPHICS 16 (August 1990).
123 Cf Breyer, supra note 15, at 294-99, 302.
124 Since the compiler must recoup $1,000 over 1,000 copies, she must add $1 to the
distribution cost, for a total price of $2 per copy.
125 The free rider incurs $2 in "development costs" by purchasing one copy from the
original compiler. When added to production and distribution costs of $1 per copy for 1,000
copies, a total of $1,002 must be recovered in 1,000 sales. This implies a sale price of
1,002/1,000, or $1.002. Since a penny represents the smallest increment of commerce, the
price must be rounded to $1.01.
126 Our compiler has $1,000 in development costs plus a total of $100,000 in
distribution and production costs. When divided over 100,000 sales, a price of $1.01
results.
127 The free rider now incurs $1.01 in "development costs" by purchasing one copy
from the original compiler. When added to production and distribution costs of $1 per copy
for 100,000 copies, a total of $100,001.01 must be recovered in 100,000 sales. This implies
a sale price of 100,001.01/100,000, or $1.0000101. Since a penny represents the smallest
increment of commerce, the price must be rounded up to $1.01.
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up production, market the competing work, and distribute it. Since the
competitor cannot begin this process until after the original has been marketed,
the original compiler is guaranteed a period of time during which only she will
be selling the work.
This natural monopoly clearly provides compilers a chance to recoup
development costs. If the compilation contains information which is time
sensitive, these sales will occur at monopoly prices. 128 Profits earned during
this time can certainly be applied against development costs. The amount of
recoupment, however, may not be significant unless the length of the monopoly
and the revenue earned are sufficiently large. Although the monopoly period
may often be so short that no significant recoupment will occur, 129 it turns out
that compilers can occasionally increase significantly both the length and
profitability of natural monopolies.
The most obvious way to lengthen the natural monopoly is to discourage
potential competitors from entering the market. In some cases, compilers adopt
strategies to directly prohibit users from copying data. Facts distributed via
computer may be "copy protected," 130 and compilers sometimes require
promises against copying and disclosure as a condition of access to their
works. 131 In other cases, compilers take steps which may not prohibit copying,
but simply remove some of its benefits. If facts are disseminated "on-line,"
charges for copying or downloading cut down or eliminate the profit any
128 It goes without saying that a monopolist will, if possible, charge monopoly prices.
One might ask, however, why any consumer would pay monopoly prices if free riders are
eventually going to drive prices down. The answer lies in circumstances which make
information particularly valuable today, but considerably less valuable tomorrow. This is
often the case with business, financial and other economic data. In these cases, consumers
of information may find paying monopoly prices for immediate access to information
preferable to waiting for the price to come down.
129 Of course, this depends on the relative costs of copying, marketing, distributing,
and the like. For divergent estimates of these items, compare Breyer, supra note 15, with
Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for Published Books: A Reply
to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1100 (1971) and Breyer, Copyright. A Rejoinder,
20 UCLA L. REV. 75 (1972).
130 See Palmer, supra note 42, at 288-89.
131 See id. at 291-95. In cases of mass distribution, compilers might try to enforce so-
called "shrink-wrap" licenses. These licenses are ordinarily printed on the packaging in
which information is distributed, along with the statement that the customer agrees to all the
printed terms by opening the package. Not surprisingly, these licenses can prove difficult to
enforce. By contrast, agreements reached in face-to-face negotiations may prove less
problematic. For analysis of the relevant problems, see Note, Offers Users Can't Refuse:
Shrink-Wrap License Agreements as Enforceable Adhesion Contracts, 10 CARDOZO L. REV.
2105 (1989); Stem, Shrink-Wrap Licenses of Mass Marketed Softivare: Enforceable
Contracts or Whistling in the Dark?, 11 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. LJ. 51 (1985).
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competitor might realize. 132 Similarly, regular printing of updated editions
makes copying less desirable because consumers will likely prefer the new
edition to the old one even if only a few changes have been made. 133
The foregoing discussion shows that compilers will often establish and
maintain significant periods during which they enjoy a monopoly in the market.
This sets the stage for profit maximizing strategies which can even further
increase the likelihood of significant recoupment of development costs. At the
very least, compilers who enjoy secure monopolies are likely to charge
monopoly prices, thereby raising their profits. Additionally, compilers may
solicit advertisements and add the revenue to monopoly profits already being
exacted from consumers. 134 In still other cases, the compiler will be able to
charge those listed in the compilation for the privilege of inclusion.135 Finally,
compilers will try to raise their profits even further through price
discrimination. 136
Price discrimination occurs when a seller is able to charge consumers
different prices for the same product. It is considered advantageous for sellers
to practice price discrimination because it enables sellers to extract the
maximum amount each consumer is willing to pay. By contrast, if a seller must
charge the same price to all, extraction of the maximum amount is unlikely
because some consumers will buy the good for less than they are willing to
pay. 13 7
For example, suppose that a compiler wants to distribute a large collection
of data. Suppose further that there are two classes of potential buyers. Class A
has 100 members with only a passing interest in the data. Its members will only
view the data briefly and are, therefore, willing to pay 100 dollars each for
access. Class B has ten members, but they have an intense interest in the data
and will examine the compilations at some length. Each member of class B is,
132 Interestingly, one survey of database producers concluded that most on line
providers do not object to downloading for personal use. The same study also claims that
"despite their worst fears, downloading has not put any producers out of business."
Garman, Downloacdng. . . Still a Live Issue?, ONLiNE 15 (July 1986). This suggests that
on line data base producers may not be encountering significant difficulty in recouping
development costs. For a study of pricing strategies for information, see Hawkins, In Seard
ofIdeal Infornation Pricing, ONLINE 15 (Mar. 1989).
133 Copyright scholars are only too familiar with the Nimmer treatise and its frequent,
expensive updates. See also Besen, supra note 117, at 29.
134 See Besen, supra note 117, at 15-18. For example, newspapers raise substantial
revenue through advertising.
135 Cf J.R. O'Dwyer Co. v. Media Mktg. Int'l, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 599, 601
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (compiler able to charge $25 fee for inclusion in his directory).
136 See Besen, supra note 117, at 21-23; Palmer, supra note 42, at 295-96.
137 For a definition and discussion of price discrimination, see S. CALL & W.
HOLOHAN, supra note 102, at 275-85; J. GOULD & C. FERGUSON, MICROECONOMIC
THEORY 268-75 (1980).
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therefore, willing to pay 500 dollars for access to the data. Finally, assume that
the compiler knows of the existence and size of the two classes, but is not able
to identify who the members of each class are. If our compiler chooses to
follow a basic transaction, he will set the price of copies at 100 dollars. He
will, therefore, sell 100 copies to members of class A at 100 dollars each and
10 copies to members of class B at 100 dollars each. Total revenue will equal
11,000 dollars. 138
From the perspective of the compiler, the problem with this pricing
strategy is that the compiler has not exacted the highest revenue possible from
his customers. To be sure, his price of 100 dollars has forced class A to pay its
maximum amount for the compilation. However, the price has given a surplus
of 400 dollars to each member of class B. This surplus could be eliminated if
the compiler had some method of measuring customers' demand for the
product. If he knew who the members of class B were, he could charge them a
higher price.
The foregoing discussion shows why sellers would like to practice price
discrimination. Fortunately for compilers, certain methods of distribution or
marketing allow varying degrees of price discrimination as long as the compiler
does not face a genuinely competitive market.139 If, for example, our compiler
chose to distribute his data over an on-line system, he would no longer be
forced to charge all customers the same price for access. Instead, the compiler
might charge customers for the time they spent looking at the data. This would
effectively separate those with high demand for the compilation from those with
low demand. Moreover, if rates were set properly, it would have the effect of
extracting from each customer the full amount she was willing to pay. Similar
results may also be possible if the compiler publishes two versions of the work
- perhaps a fancy leather bound version for those willing to pay a higher price,
and a less expensive version on newsprint. 140
C. The Relationship Between Copyright Policy and Doctrine
The foregoing glance at the economics of public goods provides a
backdrop against which to evaluate the relationship between the creative
selection approach and "the progress of Science and the useful Arts." Under
the analysis already developed, copyright is a useful tool for allowing
compilers to recoup their development costs. 141 Furthermore, the free rider
problem indicates that copyright will often be necessary to ensure the desired
138 If he sets the price at $500, he will only sell 10 copies at that price to members of
class B. Total revenue would then fall to $5,000.
139 If competition exists, then the price discriminator's attempt to sell at the higher
price will be undercut by a rival willing to accept a lower profit.
140 See Besen, supra note 117, at 21-22.
141 See supra note 101-02 and accompanying text.
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production of works. 142 Nevertheless, a careful examination of the production
and marketing of factual compilations reveals that some compilers will recover
their development costs even if copyright is eliminated. Other compilers will
simply not care about recoupments.1 43 Universal extension of copyright is,
therefore, mistaken, and copyright should be denied to some, but not all,
factual compilations.
At a cursory level, the creative selection approach appears consistent with
this economic insight. Under Feist, it clearly restricts copyright to creative
compilations.144 The creative selection approach might, therefore, stand on the
judgment that development costs for creative compilations would not be
recouped without the economic incentives copyright provides.
A closer look, however, reveals that such a conclusion would be mistaken,
and that the creative selection approach does little to advance copyright's
encouragement policy. The compilations which the creative selection approach
protects are those which exhibit sufficient creativity in their selection and
arrangement of facts. For the proposed assertion about the creative selection
approach to be sound, creativity in a compilation's selection and arrangement
should reasonably correspond to the absence of significant opportunities for
recouping development costs without copyright. This is simply not the case.
According to our earlier analysis, compilers are unlikely to care about
recoupment when they have been subsidized by government or when there is
no expectation of selling the compilation.' 45 Similarly, recoupment is more
likely when the ratio of sales to development costs is high, or when the
compiler enjoys significant natural monopoly benefits. This in turn depends on
the compiler's marketing strategy and the technology available. 146
The weakness in the proposed conclusion should now be apparent. There is
simply nothing to suggest that creative selection or arrangement of facts is
positively correlated with the absence of government subsidy, nonprofit
motives, low development costs, high sales volume, or natural monopolies. All
of these conditions are equally as likely to occur for uncreative compilations as
they are for creative ones. Thus, there is no particular reason to think that the
creative selection approach directs copyright to compilations whose production
genuinely requires encouragement. If anything, it would seem that the sweat
theory, which the Court rejected, is better related to the need for
encouragement because the amount of a compiler's labor bears some
relationship to the size of development costs. Significant sweat would imply
large development costs, which in turn would suggest that a compiler would
142 See supra notes 101-19 and accompanying text.
143 See supra notes 120-40 and accompanying text.
144 See supra notes 15, 79, 94-99 and accompanying text.
145 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
146 See supra notes 123-140 and accompanying text.
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face difficulty in recouping those costs. 147 This realization exposes as
questionable any assertion that the creative selection approach's application to
factual compilations strongly promotes "the progress of Science and useful
Arts."
V. CONCLUSION: THE LEGACY OF FEIST
Without question, the Supreme Court intended to clarify copyright law
with its opinion in Feist. Unfortunately, the weak connection between
copyright policy and doctrine threatens to make Feist's legacy one of
confusion, and not clarification.
Over the short term, the major problem will be uncertainty over how to
apply the creative selection approach in light of Feist. As a doctrinal matter, it
is now clear that creativity is a prerequisite for copyright in factual
compilations. Many courts following this guidance will try to duplicate the
qualitative, subjective judgment that the Feist Court applied to Rural
Telephone's white pages listings. These courts will decide copyrightability by
making a quasi-esthetic judgment about whether the compiler's selection and
arrangement of data was too ordinary or mechanical to be considered
"creative." Other courts, however, will find this judgment too hard to duplicate
without guidance. 148 These courts will quite plausibly look to the Supreme
Court's policy statements for guidance. If they are troubled by their own
unguided use of "creativity," they will look for reassurance by interpreting the
doctrine to implement the policy of promoting the "progress of Science and
useful Arts."
Once this happens, the seeds of confusion are sown. Decisions made under
the first approach will reflect judicial selection of compilations which exhibit
some sort of esthetic appeal. By contrast, decisions made under the second
will, if done properly, reflect judicial selection of compilations whose
development costs are difficult to recoup. As shown previously, however, there
is no reason to believe that these approaches will identify the same
compilations. Indeed, it is quite likely that the production of many creative
compilations needs no further encouragement, or that the production of many
ordinary compilations requires additional economic incentives. This conflict
147 This statement should not be construed as an unqualified endorsement of the sweat
theory and the results it has been used to justify. To be sure, some version of the sweat
theory may be better than the creative selection approach at identifying which compilations
might not be produced without copyright protection. It does not necessarily follow,
however, that copyright should prohibit others from any benefits derived from a compiler's
labor. Questions about what constitutes infringement, as well as what defenses should be
available, are quite complicated and beyond the scope of this Article. For an interesting
discussion of these issues, see Ginsburg, supra note 2.
148 See supra note 13-14 and accompanying text.
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will make it difficult, if not impossible, for courts to follow precedent
consistently. 149
The foregoing analysis suggests that, at least over the short term, courts
can best achieve Feist's goal of clarity and stability by resisting the
understandable urge to resolve ambiguities in the creative selection approach by
means of the policy articulated in Feist. Instead, courts should extend copyright
to compilations solely on the basis of quasi-esthetic judgments about selection
and arrangement, even if this makes judges uncomfortable. Over the long term,
however, it is not at all clear that this course of action will be sufficient to
bring genuine clarity and stability to copyright's treatment of factual
149 The phenomenon referred to in the text may already be emerging in lower court
applications of Feist. Of the three decisions which have construed Feist, two appear
concerned with the subjective or esthetic quality of the compiler's selection and
arrangement. See Victor Lalli Enters., Inc. v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d 671 (2d Cir.
1991) (noting that the format of plaintiff's charts "is a convention: Lalli exercises neither
selectivity in what he reports nor creativity in how he reports it."); Kregos v. Associated
Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991) (evaluating plaintiff's forms as possibly "'entirely
typical,' 'garden-variety,' or 'obvious.'").
By contrast, the remaining decision appears to justify a finding of originality on the
ground that the plaintiffs compilation needs to be encouraged. In Bellsouth Advertising &
Publishing Corp. v. Donnelly Information Publishing, Inc., 933 F.2d 952 (11th Cir. 1991),
the plaintiff Bellsouth sued its competing yellow pages directory publisher Donelly for
copyright infringement. Bellsouth claimed that Donelly had committed infringement by
purchasing the name, address, and telephone numbers of all businesses in Bellsouth's yellow
pages and then printing the listings in a competing directory in substantially the same
format. 1d. at 952.
In deciding for Bellsouth, the Eleventh Circuit made some rather questionable findings
of creativity in Bellsouth's yellow pages directory. The court noted that Bellsouth had to
select the geographic area, closing date and classifications for the directory. Id. at 957.
These findings are questionable because the Feist Court failed to find similar selections
sufficiently creative. In particular, the producer of any white pages directory would also
have to select geographic area and closing dates, so it is difficult to see how these selections
support creativity. Similarly, although some selection of classifications must be made to
create a yellow pages directory, the decision to include and compile categories such as
lumber, restaurants and automobile dealers seems extremely mechanical.
Not surprisingly, the Bellsouth court seemed uneasy about its reasoning. Immediately
after stating that the yellow pages were original, the court bolstered its conclusion by
writing, "Because the Yellow Pages directory published by [Bellsouth] provides a
convenient, unique trganization of business listings and advertisements, it merits
originality." Id. at 958 (emphasis added). By characterizing the yellow pages directory as
"convenient" and "unique," the court essentially argued that the yellow pages were
economically useful and rare. If this product were not encouraged through copyright, its
possible disappearance would deprive the public of something it desired and could not
obtain elsewhere. Thus, the yellow pages deserved or "merited" the label of originality.
This reasoning clearly appeals to the encouragement policy behind copyright, and it has
resulted in a finding of copyright in aspects of a compilation which exhibit little, if any,
creativity.
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compilations. Sooner or later, someone will ask why copyright doctrine does
not serve copyright policy as well as it might. Resolution of this problem will
require some hard thinking about copyright law.
One possibility is that society could decide to revise copyright doctrine to
implement ideal copyright policy. This would require eliminating the creative
selection approach in favor of doctrine which bears a stronger relationship to
the economics of public goods. 150 This action, however, might be impossible
to take. For one thing, the Feist Court stated that creativity was a constitutional
prerequisite to copyrightability.151 If noncreative works are to be copyrighted,
Feist would have to be overruled. This could precipitate a constitutional crisis
over the scope of copyright. Even if this problem could be legislatively
finessed, 152 it is not at all clear that Congress could avoid the disruptive
influence of various interest groups.
Of course, society could also remain committed to the creative selection
approach. This, however, would require an explanation of why copyright
doctrine does not strike a better copyright balance. Perhaps the creative
selection approach is the closest we can come to the ideal. Alternatively,
society might recognize that copyright implements values besides "the progress
of Science and useful Arts," and that these values account for the difference
between copyright doctrine and the ideal copyright balance. Indeed, some have
already suggested that copyright reflects natural law theories of property by
securing for authors a fair return on their labor.153 Others have stated that
copyright protects an author's personality or personhood. 154 Still others have
explored the relationship between copyright and social construction of
"authorship."' 155 However, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to embrace
these theories.
Finally, society could decide that the suggested reconstruction of copyright
doctrine or policy is simply not worth the trouble. Although this choice will
undoubtedly seem attractive, 156 its adoption would be a great pity. For all its
flaws, copyright has firmly established itself in legal tradition. The Universal
150 For an interesting approach, see Ginsburg, supra note 2.
151 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1288 (1991).
152 One possibility would be the enactment of legislation under the Commerce Clause.
However, if one accepts this rather transparent solution to the problem mentioned in the
text, one must also wonder why the Supreme Court chose to make the scope of copyright a
constitutional issue at all. Unless one is serious about forever denying copyright (or similar)
protection to ordinary compilations, it would seem that the constitutional limitation
articulated in Feist should be considered window dressing.
153 See Yen, supra note 15; Kauffman, supra note 15.
154 See Hughes, supra note 15.
155 See Jaszi, supra note 15.
156 A prime example is the present copyright statute, in which Congress simply
adopted existing law as the definition of copyrightable subject matter. See supra note 18.
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Declaration of Human Rights guarantees rights akin to copyright. 157 As of this
writing, no fewer than 109 countries were signatories to the two major
copyright treaties. 158 Such widespread adoption of copyright certainly suggests
that copyright reflects sincerely held human values. Those values are complex,
and they often mix in a pattern which courts and commentators find
confusing. 159 These problems, however, are no reason to abandon the effort to
understand why we have copyright and how it works. If questions raised by
Feist force us to continue this effort, then so much the better. Indeed, such a
result could guarantee the legacy of Feist as one of genuine understanding.
157 Article 27 provides: "(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is
the author." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 27 (quoted in S.M. STEWART,
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 5 (1983)).
158 As of this writing, 85 countries have adhered to the Berne Convention, and 83 to
the Universal Copyright Convention. Of these, 59 are parties to both treaties, 26 have
joined only the Berne Convention, and 24 have joined only the Universal Copyright
Convention. M. BOWMAN & D. HARRIS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES, INDEX AND
CURRENT STATUS 9-10, 181-82 (1984); M. BOWMAN & D. HARRIS, MULTILATERAL
TREATIES, INDEX AND CURRENT STATUS 71, 96 (Supp. 1990); Of the countries which
have not joined either treaty, the most notable is the People's Republic of China, which
recently adopted a new copyright law. See Zhao, East Asian Executive Reports, China, vol.
12, p. 9. (Oct. 15, 1990). News reports suggest that China will soon join the Berne
Convention. Agence France Presse, June 12, 1991 and June 15, 1991 (NEXIS,
International file).
159 See supra note 15.
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